

Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B00803R000100080024-0

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT

: OSP Comments on Report by Mr. Robert F.

Frochike on DoD Intelligence

REFERENCE

: Letter from Mr. Robert F. Frochike to

DD/S&T, dtd July 11,1969, DD/S&T

2764-69

- 1. It is apparent Mr. Froehlke's report is based upon at least two fundamental assumptions:
 - a. In terms of resources (dollars and manpower), the great preponderance of the U.S. intelligence effort is carried out by the DoD, and accordingly should be managed by the Secretary of Defense.
 - b. The top civilian managers of the DoD, as distinct from those "officials who have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing weapons or setting force levels," should and can maintain objectivity in "sizing and developing" intelligence resources.
- 2. However, in the evaluation, analysis, and production of intelligence, the presence of non-DoD membership in the USIB as well as the non-DoD chairman sets as a necessary check and balance which provides the National Security Council a cross section of Government-wide viewpoints on intelligence matters. It is obvious that Mr. Frochlike's paper leaves unanswered important questions concerning the roles of the DCI and USIB in intelligence resource allocation as well as recognition of the DCI's responsibilities pertaining to the protection of intelligence and intelligence resources.

OSD Review Completed

NRO and DIA review(s) completed.

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- 3. Mr. Froehlke acknowledges the intra-DoD problem of managing intelligence resources in the light of intelligence needs:
 - a. "The DoD intelligence community at the present time does not know the minimum level of information that will satisfy a stated requirement." (page 4)
 - b. "Further, there is a tendency to develop options made available by rapidly expanding technology simply because they are available." (page 4)
 - c. "A major factor in the development of the Five-Year Intelligence Plan is the requirement to establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs and risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this . . . DIA has an analysis under way which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this problem. Other efforts are under way to help solve this problem. "(page 8)
- Mr. Froehlke offers means to cope with this problem; however, his solution extends too far and encompasses too much. To wit, the entire DoD ball of wax includes the NRP, yet at the same time seeks the demise of EXGOM and incorporates its roles and functions into a larger DoD-centered structure, namely, the Executive Council. Inasmuch as the NRP is functioning with a modest degree of success, and to a great deal of success compared with the CIP and the CCP, we submit that the DCI take the position that, rather than include the NRP in the DoD intelligence reorganization at this time, the NRP remain separate, reporting to its present EXCOM; and, when DoD reaches a comparable level of management success over the CIP and CCP and other DoD intelligence functions, that thought be given at that time to addressing the desirability of merging the NRP with the rest.

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- 4. With this thought in mind of excluding the NRP from the proposed organization, we suggest that the DOCI be the designated member to the Executive Council for Defence Intelligence. This would permit not only CIA attendance "because of obvious interest" but also would permit the Director to function more freely as an independent . Di.
- 5. Mr. Froehlke's paper represents a significant step forward in an effort to put DoD's house in order. It is a move to have DoD deal with the intelligence resource problem; and, while DoD may not be foreclosing on the DCI's roles and responsibilities, it definitely is not counting on it. We have limited our remarks on the impact of Mr. Froehlke's paper to that which concerns this Office specifically, namely, the NRP. Undoubtedly, there are other potential impacts vis-a-vis the Director's role and responsibilities as DCI.

JOHN J. CROWLEY Director of Special Projects

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